Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint

• Brentano
  • I’ve heard this name in the context of Phenomenology before (blu3mo)

  • Michael Dummett indirectly indicated that Franz Brentano is the origin of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. (source: Wikipedia)

    • I see.

All the data of our consciousness are divided into two great classes - the class of physical and the class of mental phenomena.

For instance, we encounter statements like the following: sensation and imagination are distinguished by the fact that one occurs as the result of a physical phenomenon, while the other is evoked by a mental phenomenon according to the laws of association. But then the same psychologists admit that what appears in sensation does not correspond to its efficient cause.

• It’s difficult to clearly distinguish them.

Our aim is to clarify the meaning of the two terms “physical phenomenon” and “mental phenomenon,” removing all misunderstanding and confusion concerning them.

• Let’s focus on the term “phenomenon.”
  • Is it related to Phenomenology?
    • I wonder.

First, let’s clarify the concepts as usual.

• Every idea or presentation which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination is an example of a mental phenomenon.

  • Ah, so sense perception is also a mental phenomenon.

• Examples of physical phenomena, on the other hand, are a color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I sense; as well as similar images which appear in the imagination.

  • I don’t understand…

According to this view, it would be possible for us to characterize physical phenomena easily and exactly in contrast to mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which appear extended and localized in space.

• What does “extension” mean?

• All physical phenomena, it is said, have extension and spatial location, whether they are phenomena of vision or of some other sense, or products of the imagination, which presents similar objects to us.

• Is it about whether they have a position or not?
• However, there are many criticisms that this definition is not valid because there are physical phenomena that do not have extension and mental phenomena that do have it.

This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena.

• As another definition, “intention.”
  • Ah, is it related to “extension”?

  • This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomena show anything similar to it. Therefore, mental phenomena can be defined as phenomena that include the object intentionally within themselves.

• It’s about Intentionality.
  • Is it about the presence of an object?

However, here we encounter controversy and contradiction. In particular, Hamilton denies this characteristic in a broad range of mental phenomena called emotions.

• Is it an argument that emotions don’t have an object because they only have the subject?

• Emotions still maintain the “subject-object” relationship, to borrow Hamilton’s words. It is incorrect to say that everything about emotions is “subjectively subjective,” as Hamilton claims. This expression is actually self-contradictory because if the reference to the object is impossible, the reference to the subject is also impossible. Furthermore, when Hamilton talks about the “fusion” of emotions and mental impressions, careful consideration reveals that he is contradicting himself. All “fusion” is a unity of several things, and even this descriptive expression, which is intended to specifically recognize the unique nature of emotions, indicates a certain duality within unity.