Identity and Time

From PHILUN3601 Metaphysics There are synchronic and diachronic identity questions in 共時態 and 通時態.

• The synchronic approach considers the language at a specific moment without taking its history into account. Synchronic linguistics aims to describe a particular moment of language, usually the current one. In contrast, the diachronic approach considers the development and changes in language over time. https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/共時態と通時態

• It’s like whether to look at the present or the accumulation of history.

  • Having an image of 累積和.

• Does it also overlap with identity in the sense of equality?

  • Is “one’s identity” identical with that of other times?
  • Is what we consider as “oneself being identical” what is commonly referred to as “identity”?
    • This connects with Indiscernibility of Identicals.

• soul, brain, bundle theory, psychological continuity, etc.

  • Intuitively, it seems most fitting to consider the same identity if there is the same memory (blu3mo).
    • Just like recognizing the same computer if the contents of the hard drive are the same even if the CPU or GPU is changed or the OS is updated.
    • Well, in the case of a PC, it requires the execution files for processing, and all abilities depend on memory, so that aspect might be a bit different from humans.

• deflationism

  • The answer is determined by the definition of the meaning of “self,” so it’s fine to define it as appropriate. It seems like an argument that is about determining the usage of the word “self” and doesn’t address the significant issue of whether there is a substantial fear related to riding a teleporter.

  • Parfit:

    • Things like the identity of the body or whether it survives are not important.
    • Only psychological continuity matters.
    • If you focus on continuity, it can branch off, so it’s no longer identity(?)
      • Even considering Indiscernibility of Identicals, if there was an original, you can discern it from the new one.
      • And then he’s saying that such things are irrelevant.

  • counter

    • This scenario forces us to question whether psychological continuity alone suffices to capture all we care about in personal identity.

    • Distinction Between Metaphysics and Epistemology: Traditionalism may argue that Parfit confuses metaphysical questions about identity (what makes person-at-t2 the same as person-at-t1) with epistemological ones (how we can know if person-at-t2 is the same as person-at-t1). Traditionalists emphasize that just because we may not know if two temporal instances of a person are the same, it doesn’t mean there isn’t a factual answer.

      • mixing metaphysics and epistemology
        • This seems like a point that could be made about various philosophical matters.

Parfit’s Deflationism radically diverges from our traditional ways of thinking. It can be reasonable to let go of established beliefs under philosophical examination.

• Isn’t it okay to diverge from traditional ways of thinking?